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This paper aims at examining wage compression in Europe using the publicly available data on 
wages drawn from the Structure of Earnings Survey 2002. By wage compression, it is meant here 
that the difference in productivity across workers or firms is only partly reflected by the 
difference in wages. The paper specifically considers the existence of wage compression both 
across occupations and levels of education by means of cross-sectional econometric analysis. 
Looking at wage compression across occupations, robust evidence gives some support to the 
conventional view that there is a compressed wage distribution in Europe. While the estimated 
wage compression is even higher across the levels of education and is seen in a majority of 
industries, the evidence appears much less robust than that obtained across occupations. Wage 
compression seems to be higher in the euro area and EU15 than in the New Member States and 
the two Acceding Countries, which is in line with their more flexible wage bargaining setting. 
Likewise, wage compression mainly occurs in continental and southern countries, whilst no 
compression is detected in Anglo-Saxon countries and mixed evidence is found in Northern 
European countries. Moreover, the compression of wages is not uniform across wage levels, 
which is consistent with the stylised fact that there is more wage compression at the lower end of 
the earning distribution. Compared with the counterfactual where relative wages mirror relative 
productivity, wage compression would induce some job losses for low-skilled people. However, 
this paper does not provide conclusive empirical evidence on whether wage dispersion has a 
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Summary of the main findings 
The purpose of this paper is to examine wage compression in Europe using the publicly released data on 
wages drawn from the Structure of Earnings Survey 2002 (SES 2002). Although the information is only 
available in terms of group-specific averages and not in the form of individual data, one advantage of the 
SES 2002 is to allow one to control for the composition of the workforce when examining wage 
dispersion. “Wage compression” is here defined as the lower difference in wages across workers or firms 
compared with the difference in productivity. This can be understood in a static way considering the level 
of relative wage and relative productivity, but also in a dynamic way as the ability of relative wages to 
swiftly respond to shocks affecting relative productivity. 
The paper first looks at the relation across European countries between the total employment rate and a 
measure of wage dispersion along a number of dimensions by means of graphical analysis. However, the 
results of graphical analysis are more than unclear, partly because of its inability to control for country-
specific effects. Bivariate graphical analysis indeed reasons other things being equal, while numerous 
other factors should play a great role in explaining the total employment rate. These might also suggest 
that wage compression would mainly affect the relative employment performance of some worker types 
rather than the overall employment rate. This strongly supports the need to carry out in-depth econometric 
analysis going beyond simple cross-country correlations.  
The paper then considers the existence of wage compression both across occupations and across 
educational attainments for Europe as a whole (EU25 plus the two acceding countries and Norway). 
Given the cross-sectional and “snapshot” nature of SES data, the paper only investigates the “static” 
dimension of wage compression. As relative marginal productivity cannot be observed across occupations 
or levels of education directly, the methodology is based on the derivation of a labour demand model, 
which is estimated by means of cross-sectional econometric analysis.  
Looking at wage compression across occupations, the econometric analysis gives some support to the 
conventional view that there is a compressed wage distribution in Europe. The evidence appears fairly 
robust and is confirmed by numerous econometric estimations. In particular, the existence of wage 
compression is also broadly seen when the estimation is carried out for each occupation separately so as to 
allow the degree of substitution between labour and capital to differ across occupations. Although some 
caution should be called for regarding the estimated magnitude of wage compression, the compression 
coefficient would be around one fifth/one fourth, meaning that relative wages in logarithm are reduced by 
at most one quarter compared with what the productivity level should allow.  
As far as the wage structure by level of education is concerned, the empirical findings broadly confirm 
that the wage distribution is compressed in Europe. The estimated coefficient of compression is even 
higher than that computed across occupations. However, it should be emphasised that the evidence 
appears much less robust across educational attainments than across occupations: the findings with respect 
to the levels of education are in particular very sensitive to the inclusion of dummies and to the choice of 
the educational base used to compute relative wages. This is most likely due to the fact that educational  
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attainment is too coarse a measure to capture the various levels of professional skills. Furthermore the 
level of education attained refers to the personal skills of the worker rather than the set of skills actually 
required for the job currently occupied, which is indeed the most relevant variable regarding wage 
determination. Indeed, the phenomenon of over-qualification in some European countries might blur the 
overall picture. 
The pattern of educational wage compression is shared by a majority of industries: manufacturing; 
construction; wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; real 
estate, renting and business activities and, to a lower extent, mining and quarrying. Conversely, no clear 
sign of wage compression emerges from electricity, gas and water supply, financial intermediation, public 
administration and defence; education, health and social work. 
Overall, wage compression by both occupation and education seems to be higher in the euro area and 
EU15 than in the New Member States and the two Acceding Countries, which is in line with their more 
flexible wage bargaining setting. Within the EU15, wage compression mainly occurs in continental and 
southern countries, whilst no compression is detected in Anglo-Saxon countries, which confirms the 
stylised facts often reported on these groups of countries. However, mixed evidence is found for Northern 
European countries, where the econometric analysis points to compressed wage structure across education 
levels but not across occupations.  
Notably, the compression of wages is not uniform across wage levels: there is more wage compression at 
the lower end of the earning distribution, which is consistent with the conventional view. This suggests 
that, compared with the counterfactual where relative wages mirror relative productivity, compression of 
wage distribution would induce some job losses for low-skilled people. The idea that wage compression 
mostly has a bearing on relative employment performance of some disadvantaged groups could very 
tentatively explain the lack of obvious (static) relationship between wage dispersion and the total 
employment rate across countries.   
- 5 - 
1. Introduction 
 
Wage moderation in the euro area appears to have been a crucial element of macroeconomic stability in 
recent years and may partly explain the resilience of employment in the face of the economic slowdown. 
However, there is still a long way to go towards achieving Lisbon employment targets in Europe. 
Consideration should also then be given to the microeconomic structure of wages, which may also affect 
the macroeconomic performances. Indeed, there has been growing interest amongst researchers and policy 
makers in the labour market institutions, which are considered as a key factor influencing employment 
performance and wage determination in Europe (e.g. Nunziata, 2005). Wage distribution could be one of 
the channels through which some institutions, particularly those shaping the wage setting, impact labour 
market performances (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997). Moreover, a problem often mentioned about the 
European Union labour markets is the relatively low employment rate seen in specific groups, such as 
youth, women, older workers and the low skilled, while the prime-age employment rate is much higher 
and broadly similar to that of the US (Dolado et al., 2001). This is often attributed to the compressed wage 
structure in Europe. 
Statistically, the dispersion of wage distribution is often claimed to be much lower in Europe than in the 
United States ( Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2001). In economic terms, “wage compression” means the 
difference in wages across workers or firms in Europe that does not reflect the (wider) difference in 
productivity. This mismatch can be understood in a static way comparing the level of relative wage and 
relative productivity, but also in a dynamic way as the ability of relative wages to swiftly respond to 
shocks affecting relative productivity. According to many authors, the lack of wage dispersion in Europe 
might cause under-employment in disadvantaged groups which are more vulnerable to long-term 
exclusion. Therefore, it is important to ensure that wage-bargaining systems allow wages to reflect 
productivity, taking into account productivity differences across skills and local labour-market conditions.  
The recent release of the results of the Structure of Earnings Survey for 2002 (SES2002) by Eurostat 
sheds light on the wage structure in Europe. As well as yielding a snapshot of the overall wage structure 
with inter-percentile gaps, the survey provides useful information on average hourly and monthly wages 
across a number of relevant dimensions: educational attainment, sectors, occupation, firm size, gender or 
age group. Although the data recently disseminated by Eurostat remain fairly aggregated and expressed as 
average hourly wages, this information can be adjusted for the composition of the workforce in terms of 
skills, occupations and sectors, which differs from country to country. Freeman and Schettkat (2001a) 
emphasised the importance of such compositional effects, when showing that the compression of wages in 
Germany compared with those in the US partly comes from the compression of skill distribution in 
Germany. Moreover, the information on hourly wages is more relevant than that on monthly wages to 
study wage dispersion in Europe, since it is not distorted by the number of hours worked and in particular 
the impact of overtime and part-time, which vary a lot across European countries.  
- 6 - 
Based on the recent results of the SES 2002, the paper identifies the existence of employment-detrimental 
wage compression in Europe using a labour demand setting. The methodology has two characteristics: the 
estimates of wage compression are model-based; the focus of the study is the EU25 plus the acceding 
countries.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the literature on the causes and 
effects of wage compression. Section 3 examines the relationship across European countries between 
aggregate employment rate and a measure of wage dispersion computed along a number of dimensions by 
means of graphical analysis. Section 4 sets out the theoretical framework. Section 5 presents the data and 
the econometric methodology. Section 6 presents and discusses the econometric results. This section 
looks at the existence of wage compression both across occupations and across educational attainments. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Origins and effects of wage compression: a literature survey 
The economic literature has been very fertile in explaining the wage compression and in understanding 
the relationship between wage dispersion and employment. 
Economic theory offers two non-mutually-exclusive types of explanation for the existence of wage 
compression.  
•  The first one explains wage compression as being caused by exogenous labour market institutions 
such as minimum wages (which affect the lower end of wage distributions), trade-unions, central 
bargaining framework, governmental extension of collective agreements or any institution which 
contributes to raise the reservation wage, such as generous unemployment benefits. Koeniger et 
al. (2005) investigate the importance of labour market institutions such as unemployment 
insurance, unions, firing regulation and minimum wages for the evolution of wage inequality 
across countries. Their estimates for 11 OECD countries suggest that labour market institutions 
can account for a large part of the change in wage inequality across countries after controlling for 
time and country effects.  
•  The second type of explanation identifies endogenous causes for wage compression. For instance, 
Booth and Zoega (2002) provide micro-foundations for wage compression by modelling wage-
setting in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and firms
1. In 
their model, wage compression arises quite naturally in market economies and does not depend on 
the existence of ad-hoc institutional structures such as minimum wages and unions. Using a Nash 
Bargaining framework with on-the-job search, Shimer (2004) concludes that there can be wage 
                                                 
1 Some firms hire higher ability workers who collectively perform better and this collective ability determines the intra-firm level 
of task complexity. Because of the finite number of higher ability workers, firms able to do the most complex tasks constitute 
a “narrow market” where they have a monopsony power. As a result, wages are compressed within firms, so that low-ability 
workers are paid more, relative to their talent, than high-ability workers.  
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dispersion in equilibrium even if all workers and firms are homogeneous. If firms are 
heterogeneous, more productive firms pay higher wages and workers switch employers whenever 
they encounter a more productive job. Ample empirical evidence gives support to the endogenous 
determination of wages, suggesting that employers pay different wages to similar workers, which 
potentially allows wages to deviate from productivity in some cases. Krueger and Summers 
(1988) show that, after controlling for personal characteristics, some US industries pay wages up 
to 20% above and below the average wage. Similarly, taking a descriptive and macro approach at 
the euro area level, Genre, Momferatou and Mourre (2005) show that workers’ characteristics fail 
to fully explain wage differentials across industries, which are partly linked to firms’ 
characteristics, such as corporate size and capital intensity. Two explanations are put forward in 
the literature: either employers pursue different wage policies or high-wage firms attract more 
able workers. Empirical studies by Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (2000a, 2000b), 
based on the analysis of matched employer-worker data for both the U.S. and France, conclude 
that the two are equally important as explanations of inter-industry differentials and that wage 
policy differences account for 70% of the size differentials.  
Besides its origin, the second critical issue covered by the economic literature is the impact of wage 
compression on employment or more generally on labour market performance.  
•  A first vein of research looks at the impact of minimum wages on employment. Although many 
economists traditionally argue that the effect of a binding minimum wage law is to reduce firms’ 
demand for low skill workers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) state that this prediction of worker 
displacement depends critically on the assumption that the productivity of employees is not 
dependent upon the wage. They find that in an efficiency wage model, a minimum wage may 
increase the level of employment in low wage jobs. More generally, such a result reflects either 
the case of an efficiency wage model with a large number of employers (Manning, 1995, Rebitzer 
and Taylor 1995) or that of labour demand under monopsony (Burdett and Mortensen 1998). 
While recent empirical studies fail to reach a consensus on the issue of the employment effects of 
minimum wages (Neumark and Wascher 2000 and Card and Krueger 2000), Strobl and Walsh 
(2002) argue that, in a more general and realistic employment contract where not only a wage but 
also a set of working conditions are specified, an employment subsidy is a more effective way of 
improving welfare than minimum wages.  
•  A second strand of research focuses on the general impact of wage compression or wage 
inequality on employment. For instance, Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001) show that, controlling for 
country- and time-specific effects, high employment is associated with high levels of wage 
inequality. They suggest that US relative unemployment of most disadvantaged groups fell in 
recent years in part because the more flexible labour market institutions prevailing in the US 
allow economic shocks to affect real and relative wages to a greater degree than in other OECD 
countries. In another paper, Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) find that greater wage compression  
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caused by a high degree of involvement of unions in wage-setting would lead to relatively lower 
employment rates for young and older individuals than for the prime-aged (particularly for prime-
age men), given the labour demand elasticities for these different groups
2. They also find evidence 
that the wage compression induced by higher unionisation raises the unemployment rate of young 
men and prime-age women compared to prime-age men. Lindquist (2005) shows that, when 
labour markets are competitive, even low degrees of wage compression lead to large welfare 
losses, because wage compression brings about costly unemployment among low-skilled 
workers
3. Overall, these analyses are mainly based on the theory that employment is mainly 
determined by firms’ labour demand. Therefore, restraining real wage growth results in more 
employment.  
However and as already mentioned in the case of minimum wages, the relevance of the usual labour-
demand side story on the negative effect of wage compression should somewhat be qualified. In other 
models of employment determination at the micro level, such as efficient bargaining or employer 
monopsony models, wage increases may possibly induce employment growth (Card and Krueger 2000). 
For instance, compression in wage distribution may have a positive impact on firm-sponsored general 
training. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) find that when labour market frictions and institutions compress 
the structure of wages, firms are encouraged to invest in the general skills of their employees, as the 
distortion in the wage structure turn “technologically general” skills into “specific” skills. On an empirical 
ground, Freeman and Schettkat (2001b) highlight that the differing dispersion of wages is not a major 
contributor to differences in overall employment rates between the US and Germany, although they 
acknowledge that changes (and not level) in relative employment are related to changes in relative wages, 
raising the possibility of some substitution behaviour. The job problem in Germany may be due to a 
general lack in overall demand for labour rather than an insufficient relative labour demand affecting the 
low skilled in particular. In a recent study carrying out a descriptive analysis comparing employment 
structure in Europe and the US, the European Commission (2004) finds no clear graphical evidence in 
support of the view that differences in employment structure are mainly due to a more compressed wage 
structure in the EU.  
 
 
3. Data and graphical analysis  
 
3.1 Data 
The Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) for 2002 is the first issue of a four-yearly survey which gives 
detailed and comparable information at the European level on the earning distribution and the relationship 
                                                 
2 The wage compression, seen empirically, might result from the fact that, in maximising workers’ rent, trade unions negotiate the 
largest wage premium for groups with very elastic labour supply such as women (reflecting their high opportunity cost of 
employment, i.e. home production and child care).  
3 The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labour, however, is fairly small, since the disincentive effect of lower 
wages for the high skilled is largely offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling owing to higher unemployment.  
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between the level of remuneration, individual characteristics of employees and those of their employer
4. 
The survey reports gross wages only. It does not cover all labour costs and in particular excludes 
employers’ social security contributions and other non-wage labour costs
5. Therefore, this study focuses 
on wage compression and not on labour cost compression, which can be somewhat different given the 
potentially strong effect of the tax system in Europe. The reference year is the calendar year 2002. The 
statistical units of the survey are both local units belonging to enterprises with 10 or more employees and 
employees having at least one working day paid by the employer at a full rate during October 2002. For 
more details, see annex. 
 
Individual data is not yet available to researchers for legal reasons. The data released to them and to the 
public are aggregated in the form of group-average along different dimensions. In this study, we use two 
samples of the survey, both reporting information on average gross hourly wages (excluding overtime 
payments) and the number of employees. The first provides data broken down by occupation, firm size, 
gender and country, while the second consists of data disaggregated by level of education, industry, 
gender and country. In order to fully exploit the cross-sectional information of SES data, we use all the 
country data available: the paper not only covers the EU25 countries (excluding Portugal, Greece and 
Malta) but also includes the two acceding countries (AC2), i.e. Bulgaria and Romania. Norway, whose 
economy is fairly close to that of several EU15 countries, has also been added in the sample in order to 
increase the efficiency of the estimations
6. 
 
Chart 1 shows the variation of hourly wages across education attainments. The average hourly wage of 
people with tertiary education is 84% higher in the EU25 than that of people with lower secondary 
education or less. Chart 2 illustrates that wage dispersion is even more acute across occupations. The 
average hourly wage of legislators, senior official and top managers is 2.3 times as high as that of 








                                                 
4 A first Structure of Earnings Survey was conducted in 1995. However, it has a lower geographical coverage and was not fully 
comparable with the subsequent surveys, which are to be carried out under new regulations aiming at providing more accurate 
and harmonized data on earnings in EU Member States. 
5 Gross hourly wages (referred to as gross hourly earnings in the survey) are the remuneration in cash paid to the employee 
directly and regularly by the employer at the time of each pay period, before deductions of any tax and social security 
contributions payable by employee and withheld by the employer. 
6 Data for Portugal, Greece and Malta were not available when the database was compiled and the bulk of the current study was 
carried out. At the date of the publication, data were not available for Malta yet. Likewise, it should be noted that the 
decomposition of earnings by education level and sector for the UK was not posted in the Eurostat website when the current 
study was started.  
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Chart 1. Hourly wage by educational attainment 



























Chart 2. Hourly wage by occupation 





























































































































































































































3.2 Employment rate and wage dispersion across countries: a graphical analysis 
This section aims at collecting initial evidence of any simple relationship between employment 
performance and wage dispersion by means of graphical analysis. Wage dispersion is computed as the 
coefficient of variation of nominal earnings
7 along a series of dimensions such as occupation and level of 
education. Similar types of graphical analysis can for instance be found in Coelli et al. (1994).  
The graphical analysis comparing country-specific employment rates and the level of wage dispersion 
turns out to be inconclusive. When considering the inter-percentile range of wage distribution (see chart 
3), a negative relationship appears. However, this negative correlation might be partly optical and related 
to the composition of workforce by skills: if a country manages to integrate a lot of low-skilled people 
                                                 
7 This measure of wage dispersion is corrected for the gender composition of employment, given the huge difference in Europe in 
female participation and the existence of a high gender pay gap in some European countries.   
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into its labour market thanks to well-designed policies, this could influence the overall wage structure by 
reducing the range between the 10
th and 50
th percentiles for instance. The role of skill compression on 
wage dispersion was clearly highlighted by Freeman and Schettkat (2001a). 
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The SES 2002 helps circumvent this difficulty by providing useful information on the composition of 
wages by occupation, educational attainment and sector. However, the negative correlation between the 
employment rate and wage dispersion still holds. As regards occupations, there is a negative albeit fairly 
loose relationship (chart 4). Although a negative relationship is still depicted when considering wage 
dispersion by level of education, the R² becomes lower (chart 5). Moreover, looking at the relationship 
between relative wage (as a percentage of average wages) and the share in total employment, a negative 
correlation emerges in a low-pay sector such as hotel and restaurant and a positive one in a high-pay 
sector such as financial intermediation, suggesting that wage dispersion might benefit some specific 
sectors (chart 6). However, the low R² attached to these relationships remains very low, which hampers 
strong interpretation. Overall, one should refrain from inferring any clear-cut relationship between wage 
dispersion and overall employment performance. 
 
Chart 4 


























































Note: Wage dispersion is measured by the coefficient of variation, which is calculated as the ratio of standard 
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Chart 5 





















































Note: Wage dispersion is measured by the coefficient of variation, which is calculated as the ratio of standard 
deviation to mean value. 
 

















As mentioned in another paper (Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2001), these unclear findings would illustrate that 
the graphical analysis generally fails to control for country-specific effects, which can be very strong
8. 
The country dimension is all the more important because the macroeconomic and employment 
                                                 
8 The lack of clear evidence coming from graphical analysis can be emphasised further when noting that there is surprisingly no 
cross-country correlation between wage dispersion by level of education, sector and occupation.  
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performance may partly be shaped by the type of social model prevailing in a particular country 
(Frederiksen et al., 2005). Therefore, a more thorough econometric analysis is required to go beyond 
simple cross-country correlations. Moreover, even if no real impact of wage dispersion existed on overall 
employment performance, this would not mean at all that there is no effect of relative wages on relative 
employment performance. A similar case emerges in the literature with the impact of Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL). While there is no consensus on the long-term effect of EPL on total 
employment level, there is sound evidence that it affects the relative employment situation of specific 
groups, improving that of the prime-age people and worsening that of youth, female and older workers 
(Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2001, Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela 2002).  
 
 
4. Theoretical framework: a simple labour-demand model  
In order to identify the degree of wage compression in Europe, we need to develop a simple model, which 
relates wages to the relative employment by using a standard labour demand framework. The idea is to 
examine whether the (absolute value of) wage coefficient in the relative employment equation is higher 
than that in the employment equation. If so, there is evidence of wage compression. 
We first consider a CES production function with two production factors and constant returns to scale, as 
proposed by Arrow et al. (1961): 
1 1 1















α α i i i i K L a Y  
with Y standing for output, L for labour, K for capital, a for labour-enhancing technical progress
9, α for 
the labour-intensity of the method of production and σ for the elasticity of substitution between effective 
labour (aL) and capital. The subscript i represents a specific type of workers or firms (sector, age bracket, 
skill level, occupation, gender, contract type, etc). Assuming that firms do not necessarily operate in a 
perfectly competitive environment, the first order condition of firm’s profit maximisation leads to equate 
the marginal labour productivity to the mark-up adjusted real compensation per employee µ.(w/p) with µ 
being the mark-up over costs in the case of imperfect competition























=                                                               (1) 
After rearranging and writing in logarithms, we end up with a standard employment equation:  
log Li= log Yi - σ log(w/p)i - (1- σ) log ai + σ log(α/µ)                                        (2)  
                                                 
9 a represents the labour efficiency. It can also be seen as the degree of labour-augmenting technical progress (i.e. Harrod-neutral 
technical progress). 
10 The SES 2002 data dealt with in this study cover gross wages, which exclude non-wage labour costs (mainly employers’ social 
security contributions). However, we can arguably suppose that within a given country, the share of non-wage costs in total 
labour costs is not substantially different along the wage distribution. In any case, this study focuses on wage compression 
and not on labour costs compression, which can be even higher given the effect of the tax system.   
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The employment level depends on total output, real wages and labour-augmenting technical progress (i.e. 
Harrod-neutral technical progress). The elasticity of employment to real labour costs equals minus one 
times the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. The latter is conventionally assumed to lie 
between zero and unity, which reflects the imperfect substitution between production factors. This implies 
that the elasticity of employment to real labour costs is negative and lower than 1 in absolute value and 
that the coefficient of labour-augmenting technical progress is negative as well. This assumption is only 
called into question when the production factors are complements instead of substitutes, which is not 
plausible as shown by some studies (e.g. Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003).  
If we consider two different types of workers or firms i and 0 with 0 serving as a base, the relative mark-up 
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Allowing for wage compression would mean that relative wage is lower than relative productivity. So, 































































































log          (4) 
If c equals 1, this expression comes down to (3) expressed in logarithm. If c ranges between 0 and 1, there 
is wage compression. Conversely, if c is negative, the elasticity of relative wages to relative marginal 
product of labour becomes higher than unity: there is a stretched wage distribution.  
 
After rearranging (4), we obtain the relative employment equation:  
() 0 0 0 log log
1






− = −    (5) 
where:  
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− − + − − + −
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+ − = i i i i i i c
a a p p
c
Y Y  
or more simply:  0 0 log log Y Y i i − = γ  if we assume that p, a, α and µ  are constant across the types of 
workers/firms considered
11. In this setting, the higher the wage compression, the lower the relative 
employment rate. If there is no wage compression, the coefficient of relative wage equals the elasticity of 
substitution
12. 
The coefficient of compression cannot be estimated directly as it cannot be disentangled from the 
elasticity of substitution in (5). It can, however, be calculated indirectly by comparing the results of the 
                                                 
11 If the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity, the production function becomes a Cobb-Douglas function and relative 
employment rate takes the following form: log Li - log L0 = - 1/(1-c)[log(w/p)i - log(w/p)0]+ γi0 
12 In this setting, real labour cost elasticity gives a measure of the elasticity of substitution σ. In economic terms, this parameter 
means that a growth of 1% in the relative cost of labour to capital will lead to a growth of σ% in the ratio of capital to labour.  
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labour demand equation (2) and the relative employment equation (5). If the wage coefficient of the 
employment equation (2) and that of the relative employment equation (5) are denoted by W1 (i.e. -σ) and 
W2 (i.e. -σ/(1-c)) respectively, the coefficient of compression is equal to 1-W1/W2. 
Equation (5) also shows that data on relative productivity or relative output are not needed to compute c. 
It suffices to estimate the wage coefficients in (2) and (5), as the output produced by each group i and 
more broadly  0 i γ  are captured by group-specific fixed effects. This is extremely important as either 
relative productivity or relative output is very difficult to measure. In particular, there is no available data 
on any of these in the SES 2002. 
However, we have made the strong assumption in (2) that the elasticity of substitutions between labour 
and capital is the same across the different groups of workers/firms considered. It is a convenient way to 
identify wage compression. We implicitly suppose that any difference in the elasticity of employment to 
wages across groups is explained by wage compression. While this could be reasonable across education 
levels, this might however be quite debatable across occupations or sectors, where the elasticity of 
substitution may vary owing to the use of different production methods. If we relax this hypothesis, 
expression (5) becomes (assuming for simplicity that p, a, α and µ  are constant across the groups 
considered):  
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− = −   (6) 
This means that the way to identify wage compression c  remains broadly unchanged, as relative 
employment can still be written as a function of the coefficient of wage compression, the elasticity of 
substitution and relative wages. The condition to get unbiased estimate of c is that equations (2) and (6) 
should be estimated separately for each group i rather than over the full population.  
The estimated value of c can also be used to estimate the potential loss in total employment induced by 
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From a labour-demand perspective, the higher the coefficient of compression c, the lower the total 
employment. Properly speaking, this net employment loss is not an empirical estimate but rather a labour-
demand-based  theoretical effect calculated other things being equal. Consequently, this computation 
should be taken with great caution and for illustrative purposes only. Indeed, other (offsetting or 
aggravating) effects of wage compression on total employment can also be at play in real life. For 
example, a compressed wage structure might increase the work effort of those with low productivity 
(according to the efficiency wage theory) and increase the participation of the low-skilled. Conversely, if 
we consider wages of the low-skilled as given, wage compression may translate into the reduction of the 
wages of the highly skilled, bringing about a reduction of their work effort and possibly a cut in the  
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participation rate of educated females. Wage compression might also encourage the development of black 
economy and reduce the quality of official employment statistics. 
 
5. Econometric strategy 
Two equations are estimated: an employment equation and a relative employment equation. They are run 
according to different techniques (OLS with dummies, simple OLS, fixed-effects, random effects). For 
fixed effects and random effects estimations, we arrange our data as a “panel” of groups of employees 
(horizontal dimension) across countries (vertical dimension). The main technique used is OLS with 
dummies taking into account heterogeneity in the sample.  
The employment equation corresponds to the standard labour demand equation (2). It uses the level of 
employment (in logarithm) as the dependent variable and also includes GDP level and labour costs. Thus, 
the following general specification is estimated, where E denotes employment, Y real GDP and w nominal 
hourly wage rate (weighted average of gross hourly earnings of all individuals included in the group 
considered, excluding overtime payment), the i, o, s and g are country-, occupation-, corporate-size- and 
gender-dummy indices, Y an output variable (country GDP/value-added) and Xk k additional exogenous 
variables used as controls (e.g. output gap and labour market institutions) in some ancillary equations so 
as to test the robustness of the main results. ε is the residual and the equation is:  
Then we estimate a  relative employment equation, similar to equation (5) where oB denotes the 
occupation chosen as a base for the computation of relative employment and relative nominal wages. For 
convenience, the notations presented above are again taken below but with an apostrophe to signal that 
this is a symmetric but different specification. The estimated equation is
13:  





− = .  
However, if β has a positive sign (which does not comply with the theory) or if c is above 1 or below -1, 
the result for c becomes suspicious and would be considered as insignificant. As shown earlier, positive c 
points to the existence of wage compression, while a negative c points to the existence of wage extension.  
                                                 
13 The variable lnYi is not absolutely necessary as it could be included in the country dummies. However, it is directly derived 
from the equation (5). It is indeed interesting to specifically control for the “economic size” of countries or sectors (in the 
specification with education levels and sectors). Moreover, it is important to set up an identical form for both equations 
(relative employment equation and employment equation) in order to make the results as comparable as possible. In any case 
the results are not altered by the inclusion of this variable.  
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The two equations will also be estimated with a different version of the SES aggregated database, where 
occupation and corporate size are replaced by educational attainment and sector, while gender and country 
are still among the dimensions used in the sample.  
As a robustness check, we also run the employment and relative employment equation on each occupation 
o (and alternatively on each sector and each level of education) in order to take due account of the fact 
that the coefficient of compression and the coefficient of substitution between labour and capital may 
significantly vary across occupations. This comes down to estimating equation (2) and (6) described in 
section 4.  
While possible pooling bias could be removed through group-specific estimations, the flip side of this is 
that the estimation would be much less efficient due to the much lower number of observations used. This 
is the reason for running both pooled estimation and group-specific estimation in this paper. 
 
 
6. Econometric results 
6.1 Wage compression across occupations 
The empirical findings on the wage structure by occupation confirm the conventional view that there is a 
compressed wage distribution in Europe. The evidence appears robust and is confirmed by the numerous 
econometric estimations carried out in this paper. However, there is more uncertainty surrounding the 
exact magnitude of this compression as the estimated coefficients vary significantly across the samples 
and specifications used. Overall, the compression coefficient is around one fifth/one fourth
14, meaning that 
relative wages (in logarithm) are reduced by at most one quarter, compared with what the productivity 
level should allow. The existence of wage compression in Europe means that the structure of wages might 
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Table 1: overall results for EU25 +AC2 (base: legislators and managers) 
Relative employment equation in log (deviation from legislators and managers' 














Relative wage  -0.628 -0.569 -0.875 -0.897 
  (5.65)*** (8.12)*** (9.53)*** (9.82)*** 
GDP  0.212 0.078 -0.037  0.189 
   (4.38)*** (4.53)*** (1.83)*  (4.86)*** 
Observations  1970 1970 1970 1970 
R-squared  0.47 0.04 0.47 0.46 
    




OLS  Random effect  Fixed effect 
  employment employment employment employment 
Wage  -0.458 -0.469 -0.836 -0.878 
  (3.10)*** (17.55)***  (6.55)*** (6.89)*** 
GDP  1.135 1.004 0.829 1.111 
   (22.33)*** (53.30)*** (28.89)*** (26.25)*** 
Observations  1970 1970 1970 1970 
R-squared  0.76 0.59 0.76 0.80 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
        




OLS  Random effect  Fixed effect 
Relative employment 
equation   27% 18% 4%  2% 
 
Table 1 shows the results for the whole population using various econometric techniques: OLS with 
dummies
15, simple OLS, fixed effects model and random effects model. Wage compression can 
technically be seen through the elasticity of relative employment to relative wages, which is lower in 
absolute value than the elasticity of employment to wages. From a technical point of view, OLS with 
dummies ‘a priori’ seems to be the soundest approach, as it does not need to care about what should be the 
second “panel” dimension (i.e. the country in random effects and fixed effects estimations) and permits to 
correct for all the heterogeneity inherent in each dimension considered (firm size, occupation, gender and 
countries). It provides an estimate value of 27%, which is higher than the other estimates. Moreover, OLS 
regressions of the employment equation with dummies provide estimated elasticities of employment to 
labour costs of around -0.4, which is in line with time-series and panel estimates available for the euro 
area as a whole (e.g. Mourre, 2004) and the main EU15 countries (Van der Horst, 2003)
16.  
                                                 
15 The dummies capture the various dimensions at stake (i.e. firm size, occupation, gender and countries).   
16  While Mourre found the elasticity of employment to real labour costs ranging from -0.35 (pooled-time series) to -0.41 (euro 
area equation with break) and -0.55 (euro area equation without break), Van der Horst got consistent country elasticities of 
-0.12 for France, -0.48 for Germany, -0.33 for the Netherlands, -0.27 for Spain and -0.67 for the United Kingdom.  
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Table 2 suggests that wage compression is higher in EU25 than in the two acceding countries (Romania 
and Bulgaria). Within the EU25, the euro area and EU15 seem to experience a higher wage compression 
than in the New Member States. This is confirmed by evidence concerning the decentralised wage 
bargaining institutions in the New Member States, where wages are negotiated at the firm level.  
 
Table 2: wage compression by geographical areas 
Relative employment equation in log (deviation from legislators and 
managers' employment)    












Relative wage  -0.921  -1.877 -1.675  -1.099 -1.289   
  (9.55)*** (10.70)***  (10.23)***  (9.57)***  (8.23)***   
Observations  1970 725  949  1690  741   
R-squared  0.24  0.33 0.29  0.25 0.32   
           
Employment equation in log         
   total  euro area  eu15   eu25  eu10   
   employment  employment employment  employment employment   
Wage  -0.542 -0.37  -0.226  -0.534  -0.896   
  (22.61)*** (1.95)*  -1.51  (16.60)***  (14.15)***   
Observations  1970 725  949  1690  741   
R-squared  0.7  0.66 0.65  0.69 0.72   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated by OLS with GDP,  firm size, gender and occupation dummies (but without countries dummies)  
            
Estimated coefficient of compression      
   total  euro area  eu15   eu25  eu10   
   41%  80% 87%  51% 30%   
 
Looking closer at the EU15, wage dispersion may also be influenced by the type of social model. We will 
have recourse to the now traditional taxonomy of social protection models in Europe, derived from the 
seminal sociologic work by Esping-Anderson (1990), which is more and more used to evaluate labour 
market policy in Europe (e.g. Frederiksen et al., 2005)
17. As shown by Table 3, there seems to be 
relatively large wage compression in the continental and southern models (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain), which is in line with the common knowledge regarding the 
incidence of union or collective bargaining in wage determination and the admittedly rigid wage structure 
in these countries. Conversely, no significant wage compression emerges from the econometric analysis in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom), which is again consistent with the stylised 
                                                 
17  Esping-Anderson (1990) divides welfare systems into three models: a conservative model (comprising continental and 
Mediterranean countries), a liberal model (comprising Anglo-Saxon countries) and a social democratic model (including 
Northern-European countries). Frederiksen et al (2005) derive similar grouping using statistical cluster analysis of the labour 
market policies in EU countries (such as the partition method and the hierarchic method). An issue here is to know whether a 
continental model should be distinguished from a Southern European Model. As regards wage distribution, the two sub-
models share similar institutional characteristics (importance of union or collective bargaining in wage setting) and a 
admittedly rigid wage structure. Moreover, pooling the two sub-sets would give rise to more efficient panel estimations and 
would solve the problem of some borderline countries (France, Belgium) whose exact position appears less clear.  
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facts often reported on these countries (e.g. relatively high wage dispersion, weak trade unions, 
decentralised wage bargaining, large share of low-paid jobs). More surprisingly, the analysis does not 
point to any significant wage compression in the Northern European countries (Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden), which are often said to have highly compressed wage distribution, ensured by 
powerful and “consensual” trade unions and very centralised and wide-ranging wage bargaining. This 
could be due to a shortcoming of the methodology, as the results appear fairly sensitive to the country 
grouping chosen. However, looking further, this might capture a real phenomenon. The definition of wage 
compression used in this paper is not a statistical one, which just compares the interpercentile range across 
countries. With such a definition, there would indeed be little doubt that Nordic countries have a 
compressed wage structure. Conversely, the definition used in this paper looks at the possible gap 
between relative wage and relative productivity. In this respect, it could well be possible that the 
compressed wage structure across occupations in the Northern European countries matches a compressed 
productivity distribution. 
 
Table 3: wage compression by type of social model in the EU15 
Relative employment equation in log (deviation from legislators and 
managers' employment)    
   eu15 
Continental 












Relative wage  -1.675 -1.417  0.758  0.423   
  (10.23)*** (6.40)***  -1.26  -1.09   
Observations  949 474  167  308   
R-squared  0.29 0.35  0.52  0.47   
         
employment equation in log       
   eu15 
Continental 
and Southern  Anglo-Saxon 
Northern 
European  
   employment  employment employment  employment  
Wage  -0.226 -0.65  1.224  1.88   
  -1.51 (3.53)***  (1.75)*  (6.19)***   
Observations  949 474  167  308   
R-squared  0.65 0.78  0.81  0.59   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated by OLS  with GDP,  firm size, gender and occupation dummies (but without countries dummies)  
            
Estimated coefficient of compression      
   eu15 
Continental 
and Southern  Anglo-Saxon 
Northern 
European  
   87%  54%  -61%° -344%°   
°Not significant, as the wage coefficient of the relative employment equation or the employment equation is either not statistically 
significant or of a positive sign (contrary to the theory).   
 
Table 4 presents estimations of the coefficient of compression for each occupation. These allow the 
coefficient of substitution to vary across occupations, improving the identification of the coefficient of 
compression. Indeed, in the pooled estimation, the value of wage compression might partly and  
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mistakenly capture the differences in labour-capital substitution coefficient across occupations. The 
occupation-specific estimations show that the elasticity of substitution, as estimated in the employment 
equation, is the highest for professionals and not significantly different from zero for crafts and related 
trades workers. It is higher for technicians, service workers and shop and market sales workers and 
elementary occupations than for clerks and plant and machine operators. 
Table 4 confirms the widespread idea that wages are more compressed at the lower end of the wage 
distribution. Indeed, there is no evidence that wages of professionals or technicians are more compressed 
compared with those of legislators, senior officials and managers, while they are amongst the high paid 
and high skilled occupations. Conversely, wages for clerks, service workers and shop and market sales 
workers, craft workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers appear to be quite compressed 
vis-à-vis those of legislators, senior officials and managers. In particular, plant and machine operators and 
assemblers, which constitute one of the least paid and skilled occupational groups, turn out to have very 
high average wages vis-à-vis legislators, senior officials and managers. However, elementary occupations 
display no clear evidence of compression, which is somewhat puzzling. By and large, this suggests that, 
compared with the counterfactual where relative wages mirror relative productivity, the compression of 
wage distribution would induce some job losses for low-skilled people. 
 
Table 4: Wage compression by occupations for EU25 +AC2 (base: legislators and managers) 
  Total Professionals  Technicians 
and associate 
professionals 
Clerks Service  workers 































Relative wage  -0.628  -0.770 -0.762  -1.093  -0.941  -0.638 -0.425 -0.735 
   (5.65)*** (3.90)***  (5.25)***  (6.60)*** (4.25)*** (2.84)***  (1.54)  (3.35)*** 
Observations  1970  286 286  286  286  275 275 276 
R-squared  0.47  0.76 0.88  0.94  0.79  0.75 0.67 0.79 
  Employment  Employment  Employment  Employment  Employment  Employment Employment Employment 
Wage  -0.458 -1.266  -0.859  -0.433 -0.838  0.035  -0.104  -0.735 
   (3.10)***  (3.72)***  (2.50)** (1.49)  (2.65)***  (0.10) (0.28) (1.92)* 
Observations  1970  286 286  286  286  275 275 276 
R-squared  0.76  0.89 0.89  0.93  0.87  0.90 0.90 0.88 
Coefficient of 
compression  27% -64%  -13%  58% 11%  28%° 76%°°  0% 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
° adjusted by the elasticity of substitutions derived from the whole sample;°° weak significance      
Estimated in log with country-specific GDP and country, firm size, gender and occupation dummies.      
 
Robustness checks have been carried out. For instance, controlling for labour market institutions and the 
cyclical position of the economy, the estimations confirm the existence of wage compression, although of 
lower magnitude (see Table 5). In general, employment protection legislation negatively affects relative 
employment, while unemployment trap, low wage trap and output gaps exert a positive effect. Moreover, 
the coefficient of wage compression has been estimated when choosing other occupational bases than  
- 23 - 
legislators, senior officials and managers, as shown in Table 6. Although the estimated coefficient of 
compression appears somewhat sensitive to the choice of the occupational base, the existence of wage 
compression remains broadly confirmed. However, with low-paid and low-skilled occupations as a base, 
there is no clear evidence of wage compression except for craft and related trades workers. As in Table 4, 
this suggests that wage compression is not uniform across occupations and that wage compression applies 
more to low-skilled occupations
18.  
 
Table 5. Robustness check: estimation of occupational wage compression with labour market 
institutions and output gap. 
(OLS in log with country, size and occupation dummies) 
 relative  employment         employment 
 (1)  (2)  (3)     (1)  (2)  (3) 
Relative wage  -0.504  -0.471  -0.615    Wage -0.467  -0.35  -0.566 
 (3.34)***  (3.25)***  (3.77)***     (2.10)**  (1.65)*  (2.40)** 
GDP -0.920  -0.118  0.883    GDP 1.123  1.135  0.464 
 (10.04)***  (2.83)***  (11.53)***     (11.86)***  (11.54)***  (6.22)*** 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 0.815  1.14  -0.219   
Employment 
Protection Legislation  -0.539  -0.445  0.743 
 (11.16)***  (14.66)***  (1.65)*     (6.96)***  (4.78)***  (2.51)** 
Union density  -0.009  0.023  0.03    Union density  0.001  -0.002  -0.017 
 (1.91)*  (10.00)***  (7.46)***     (0.25)  -0.56  (3.21)*** 
Unemployment trap  -0.059  -0.13      Unemployment trap  0.033  0.027   
 (8.40)***  (13.88)***       (4.66)***  (3.71)***   
Low wage trap for a 
couple with two children  -0.015  0.008     
Lower wage trap for a 
couple with two 
children 0.005  0.005   
 (8.30)***  (4.52)***       (2.79)***  (2.72)***   
Training expenditures      0.073    Training expenditures      -0.036 
     (4.22)***         -1.37 
Subsidies to regular 
employment in the private 
sector     -0.265   
Subsidies to regular 
employment in the 
private sector      0.191 
     (3.97)***         (1.88)* 
Low wage trap for a 
single individual      -0.027   
Low wage trap for a 
single individual      0.026 
     (6.16)***         (3.18)*** 
Output gap  -0.419        Output gap  0.187     
 (5.90)***         (2.39)**     
Constant 15.819  7.083  -10.991    Constant -6.71  -6.548  1.383 
 (10.08)***  (8.19)***  (15.35)***     (4.16)***  (4.12)***  -1.4 
Observations 1201  1285  978    Observations 1201  1285  978 
R-squared  0.49 0.49  0.47    R-squared 0.61  0.61  0.6 
Absolute value of z 
statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
    




                                                 
18 Indeed, if we suppose that wages are mainly compressed in the low skilled occupations, it is logical that wage compression is 
more obvious when taking higher skilled occupations as a base, since the number of lower-skilled occupations in the standard 
taxonomy (ISCO-88) is higher than the higher-skilled occupations (legislators-managers, professionals and technicians).   
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Table 6. Robustness check: estimation with different occupational bases for the computation for 
relative employment and relative wages 

































emp  relative emp  relative emp  relative emp  relative emp  relative emp  relative emp  relative emp 
relative  wage  -0.921  -1.474  -0.691  -0.448 -0.562 -1.25  -0.209 -0.386 
  (9.55)***  (11.77)*** (5.31)***  (3.34)*** (4.43)*** (9.53)*** -1.51  (3.12)*** 
GDP  0.071  0.04  -0.023 -0.2  0.027 0.082 0.026 -0.033 
 (4.62)***  (2.27)**  -1.61  (13.05)***  (1.75)*  (5.34)***  (1.67)*  (2.19)** 
Observations  1970  1970  1970  1970 1970 1924 1924 1930 
R-squared  0.24  0.14  0.14  0.44 0.3  0.47 0.34 0.14 
       































    emp  emp  emp  emp emp emp emp emp 
Wage  -0.542  -0.54  -0.587  -0.639 -0.621 -0.551 -0.57  -0.615 
  (22.61)***  (22.64)***  (23.50)***  (26.51)*** (25.08)*** (22.93)*** (23.55)*** (24.26)*** 
GDP  1.007  1.005  1.006  0.997 1.021 1.01  1.009 1.011 
  (62.38)***  (63.03)***  (60.21)***  (61.88)*** (62.06)*** (63.07)*** (62.39)*** (60.24)*** 
Observations  1970  1970  1970  1970 1970 1981 1981 1980 
R-squared  0.7 0.72  0.7  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.7 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Estimated with occupation, firms' size and gender dummies       
             































   41%  63%  15%  -43%  -10%  56%     -59% 
 
Based on the theoretical model developed earlier, which only takes into account the labour-demand side, a 
tentative simulation suggests that, all things being equal, a wage compression of one quarter might lead to 
an employment loss that is far from being negligible (of around 8%, as seen in Chart 7). It should be noted 
that the employment effect is non linear and more specifically convex, as it increases more than 
proportionally. Indeed, a wage compression coefficient of 10% entails a relative employment loss of 3%, 
whilst a compression coefficient of 50% is associated with a relative employment loss of 22%. However 
and as clearly spelled out in section 4, this estimate is subject to many caveats and should be seen as 
merely illustrating the potentially negative effect of wage compression coming from the labour-demand 
side. It cannot be interpreted as the effect of wage compression on total employment observed 
empirically.   
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Chart 7. Illustrative labour-demand-based theoretical impact of wage compression on total 




































6.2 Wage compression across educational attainments 
As far as the wage structure by level of education is concerned, the empirical findings broadly confirm 
that the distribution of wages is compressed in Europe. However, unlike the wage compression across 
occupations, evidence appears very sensitive to the inclusion of dummies. If education dummies and 
country dummies are added, the coefficient of compression becomes insignificant, in the sense that the 
underlying coefficient of either the relative employment equation or the employment equation turns 
insignificant or positive, which is difficult to reconcile with the economic theory. An explanation might be 
that wage differentials are very similar across educational groups and sectors within the same country, 
which would mean that using country dummies artificially removes part of the explanatory power 
contained in the wage variable. The most plausible explanation would, however, be that the variable 
“educational attainment” (referring to four levels of education only) is too coarse to capture the various 
levels of professional skills. Moreover, the level of education attained refers to the potential skills of the 
worker rather than the skills actually required for the job currently occupied, which is the most relevant 
explanatory variable for the level of wage paid by the employer. In this respect, the phenomenon of over-
qualification and of increasing enrolment in higher education in some European countries might blur the 
overall picture. 
OLS with dummies provides an estimated value of wage compression of 47%, as shown in Table 7
19. 
However, other econometric techniques such as simple OLS, fixed-effects and random-effects, do not 
yield conclusive evidence of wage compression.  
 
                                                 
19  This estimation method gives a wage elasticity of -0.473, which is broadly consistent with the employment equation 
estimations across occupations, as presented in the section 6.1.  
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Table 7: overall results for EU25 +AC2 (base: those with tertiary education) 









employment   relative employment  
relative 
employment  
Relative wage  -0.892  -0.526  -0.325  -0.264 
 (5.52)***  (3.13)***  (2.33)**  (1.88)* 
Value added  0.15  0.03  0.123  0.12 
   (4.73)***  -1.02  (5.01)***  (4.92)*** 
Observations 1193  1193  1193  1193 
R-squared 0.18 0.01 0.17  0.02 
       




OLS  Random effect  Fixed effect 
  employment employment employment  employment 
Wage -0.473  -0.532  -0.391  -0.386 
 (9.09)***  (10.52)***  (10.14)***  (10.03)*** 
Value added  0.933  0.987  0.898  0.896 
   (26.11)***  (32.56)***  (34.28)***  (34.30)*** 
Observations 1193  1193  1193  1193 
R-squared 0.52 0.47 0.52  0.52 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated in log with country-specific GPD and country, firm size, gender and occupation dummies 
 




OLS  Random effect  Fixed effect 
  47% -1%  -20%  -47% 
 
Table 8: wage compression by geographical areas (base: those with tertiary education) 
Relative employment equation in log (deviation from those with tertiary education)    












Relative wage  -0.892  -3.582 -3.834  -1.063 0.266   
  (5.52)***  (9.86)*** (10.39)***  (5.88)*** (1.22)   
Observations  1193 510  615  1079  464   
R-squared  0.18  0.27 0.25  0.19 0.34   
           
Employment equation in log         
   total euro  eu15    eu25  eu10   
   employment  employment employment  employment employment   
Wage  -0.473  -1.802 -1.934  -0.606 -0.723   
  (9.09)***  (5.65)*** (6.61)***  (9.78)*** (6.39)***   
Observations  1193 510  615  1079  464   
R-squared  0.52  0.55 0.51  0.54 0.62   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
Estimated with GDP,  firm size, gender and occupation dummies (but without countries dummies)  
           
Estimated coefficient of compression      
 total  euro  eu15    eu25  eu10   
  47%  50% 50%  43% 372%°   
°Not significant, as the wage coefficient of the relative employment equation is positive and not statistically significant.  
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Table 9: wage compression by type of social model (base: those with tertiary education)  
Relative employment equation in log (deviation from legislators and 
managers' employment)    
   eu15 
Continental 












Relative wage  -3.834 -3.345  0.257  -5.952   
  (10.39)*** (7.77)***  -0.32  (6.64)***   
Observations  615 327  66  222   
R-squared  0.25 0.25  0.54  0.27   
         
Employment equation in log       
   eu15 
Continental 
and Southern  Anglo-Saxon 
Northern 
European  
   employment  employment employment  employment  
Wage  -1.934 -1.808  1.374  -3.405   
  (6.61)*** (4.64)***  -1.27  (5.18)***   
Observations  615 327  66  222   
R-squared  0.51 0.56  0.73  0.44   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated by OLS  with GDP,  firm size, gender and occupation dummies (but without countries dummies)  
            
Estimated coefficient of compression      
   eu15 
Continental 
and Southern  Anglo-Saxon 
Northern 
European  
   50%  46%  -435%°  43%   
°Not significant, as the wage coefficient of the relative employment equation or the employment equation is either not statistically 
significant or of a positive sign (contrary to the theory).   
 
As with occupational wage dispersion, Table 8 suggests that wage compression across educational levels 
is higher in the EU25 than in the Acceding Countries in the sample. Moreover, the euro area and EU15 
seem to witness higher wage compression than in the EU25 as a whole. The coefficient of compression is 
indeed insignificant in the New Member States, which is in line with their more flexible wage bargaining 
setting.  
Looking closer at the EU15, wage dispersion across education levels may also be influenced by the type 
of social model. As shown by Table 9, there seems to be significant and relatively large wage 
compression in the continental and southern model, while no significant wage compression emerges from 
the econometric analysis in the Anglo-Saxon countries. These results confirm those obtained as regards 
wage compression across occupations and match the common knowledge on these groups of countries. 
Conversely, wages also appear compressed across education levels in the Northern European countries, 
whilst this is not the case across occupations.  
Table 10 (in the end of this section) shows that the pattern of wage compression is shared by seven sectors 
out of eleven: manufacturing; construction; wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, 
storage and communication; real estate, renting and business activities and, to a lower extent, mining and  
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quarrying. Conversely, no clear sign of wage compression emerges from electricity, gas and water supply, 
financial intermediation, public administration and defence; education, health and social work. 
Although Table 11 shows that the diagnosis of wage compression is broadly confirmed when controlling 
for institutions, Table 12 highlights the lack of robustness of the estimates: they substantially change 
when opting for other educational bases than tertiary education. Indeed, with lower or medium education 
levels as a base, there is no clear evidence of wage compression any longer. This may underline that the 
findings are fragile due to the coarse measure of job-related skills provided by the educational level 
reached by the employee. It might also confirm that wage compression is not uniform across the levels of 
education attained by employees.  
 
Table 11. Robustness check: estimation of educational wage compression with labour market 
institutions and output gap 
(OLS in log with sector and education level dummies) 
   relative employment        employment 
Relative wage  -1.437    Wage -0.699 
 (5.21)***     (3.71)*** 
GDP 0.213    GDP 0.782 
 (2.35)**     (6.88)*** 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 0.207   
Employment Protection 
Legislation 0.182 
 (1.18)     (1.05) 
Union density  0.002    Union density  -0.011 
 (0.37)     (2.24)** 
Unemployment trap  -0.027    Unemployment trap  0.014 
 (2.88)***     (1.38) 
Lower wage trap for a 
couple with two children  0.002   
Lower wage trap for a couple 
with two children  0.003 
 (0.65)     (1.13) 
Output gap  0.051    Output gap  0.175 
 (0.99)     (2.18)** 
Constant -0.297    Constant 1.917 
 (0.33)     (1.95)* 
Observations 760    Observations 760 
R-squared  0.19    R-squared 0.45 
Absolute value of z 
statistics in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 12. Robustness check: estimation with different educational bases for the computation for 
relative wages   
Employment equation 
 
Pre-primary, primary and 
lower secondary education - 
levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997) 
Upper secondary 
education - level 3 
(ISCED 1997) 
Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education - level 4 (ISCED 
1997) 
Tertiary education - 
levels 5-6 (ISCED 
1997) 
  Relative employment  Relative employment  Relative employment  Relative employment 
Wage -0.037  0.249  -0.053 -0.891 
 -0.24  (2.07)**  -0.29  (5.73)*** 
Value added  -0.378  -0.046  0.422  0.171 
 (11.13)***  -1.61  (9.84)***  (5.34)*** 
Observations  1280 1282  984  1282 
R-squared 0.22  0.04  0.13  0.19 
 
Relative employment equation 
 
Pre-primary, primary and 
lower secondary education - 
levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997) 
Upper secondary 
education - level 3 
(ISCED 1997) 
Post-secondary non-
tertiary education - level 4 
(ISCED 1997) 
Tertiary education - 
levels 5-6 (ISCED 
1997) 
 employment  employment  employment  employment 
Relative wage  -0.63  -0.373  -0.292  -0.46 
 (13.53)***  (8.48)***  (9.20)***  (9.83)*** 
Value added  0.896  0.905  0.962  0.98 
 (25.94)***  (26.72)***  (39.91)***  (26.93)*** 
Observations 1284  1282  1432  1282 
R-squared 0.52  0.53  0.7  0.51 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated by OLS with gender and sector dummies. 
        
Estimated coefficient of compression      
                -1603%°              250%°     -451%°           47% 
°Not significant, as the wage coefficient of the relative employment equation or the employment equation is either not 
statistically significant or of a positive sign (contrary to the theory).   
    
Table 10.  Wage compression across educational attainments: breakdown by industries (for EU25 +AC2) 











































emp.  relative emp.  relative emp.  relative emp.  relative emp.  relative emp. 
relative wage  -1.121 -3.630  -0.777  -1.860  -1.122  -0.928  -1.730  0.789  -1.571  0.844  1.001 
  (2.40)** (5.04)***  (1.36)  (3.38)***  (2.41)**  (2.59)** (2.72)***  (1.57)  (3.41)***  (1.47)  (2.03)** 
Observations  116 120  116  129  124  123  126  123  124  42  50 
R-squared  0.13 0.18  0.05  0.13  0.09  0.11  0.08  0.15  0.13  0.09  0.12 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated by OLS with value-added as additional explanatory variable, as well as country, education, sector and gender dummies.           






























and social work; 
social, personal 
services 
   emp.  emp.  emp.  emp.  emp.  emp.  emp.  emp.  emp.  emp.  emp. 
Wage  -0.700 -0.926  -0.760  -0.545  -0.396  -0.286  -0.602  -0.100  -0.497  0.009  -0.287 
  (5.18)*** (4.41)***  (5.88)***  (4.05)***  (2.67)***  (1.79)* (3.57)***  (0.50)  (3.35)***  (0.05)  (2.47)** 
Observations  116 120  116  129  124  123  126  123  124  42  50 
R-squared  0.61 0.39  0.64  0.50  0.42  0.37  0.36  0.45  0.48  0.33  0.64 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated by OLS with value-added as additional explanatory variable, as well as country, education, sector and gender dummies.          






























and social work; 
social, personal 
services 
   38% 74%  2%°  71%  65%  69%  65%  113%°  68%  99%°  129%° 
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7. Concluding remarks 
Looking at wage compression across occupations, the analysis gives some support to the conventional 
view that there is a compressed wage distribution in Europe. However the evidence appears much less 
robust across educational attainments than across occupations.  
By and large, whatever the dimension considered (education or occupation), wage compression seems to 
be higher in the euro area and EU15 than in the EU25 and the acceding countries (Bulgaria and 
Romania). The coefficient of compression is indeed smaller or insignificant in the New Member States, 
which is in line with their more flexible wage bargaining setting. Including the acceding countries does 
not much alter the overall results, although wage compression by occupation might be slightly lower in 
these than in the EU25. Within the EU15, wage compression mainly occurs in continental and southern 
countries, whilst no compression is detected in Anglo-Saxon countries and mixed evidence is found in 
Northern European countries. It also seems that compression of wages is not uniform across wage levels, 
which is fully consistent with the traditional view that wage dispersion is lower at the lower end of the 
earning distribution. 
Another important open issue is to know whether wage compression has any impact on total employment. 
The evidence drawn from this paper is insufficient to provide any conclusive answer. A simple graphical 
analysis indicates that no robust and clear relationship emerges across European countries between 
aggregate employment rate and a standard measure of wage dispersion. The relationship, if any, appears 
negative, unlike what many economists would have expected. This could simply reflect the fact that 
graphical analyses generally fail to control for country-specific effects. Conversely, an illustrative 
simulation, based on a theoretical labour-demand model, would suggest that, all things being equal, the 
wage compression estimated in Europe might lead to a non-negligible employment loss. To sum up, there 
is no compelling evidence of any strong impact of wage compression on total employment. This could be 
due to the shortcoming of the data and the methodology used. Alternatively, this might point to the 
absence of any actual relationship at a macroeconomic level between wage compression and overall 
employment performance. Such a speculative hypothesis is not incompatible per se with the idea that 
wage compression could mainly (or only) harm particular disadvantaged groups of workers, such as the 
low skilled. Indeed, wage compression, i.e. the mismatch between relative wages and (greater) relative 
productivity, is more likely to hit the groups of workers experiencing highest unit labour costs (i.e. 
highest wages corrected by productivity or, in other words, highest wages per unit of output) and to 
concomitantly favour those with lowest unit labour costs. Further research with more disaggregated data 
would be needed to go further in the understanding of the macroeconomic effect of wage compression.  
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Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) for 2002: quick presentation 
The Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) for 2002 is the first of a series of four-yearly surveys to be 
conducted under the Council Regulation 530/1999 and the Commission Regulation 1916/2000. The 
objective of this legislation is to provide accurate and harmonized data on earnings distribution in EU 
Member States and Candidate Countries for policy-making and research purposes. The 2002 SES is 
aimed at giving detailed and comparable information, at European Union level, on earnings 
distribution and relationships between the level of remuneration, individual characteristics of 
employees and those of their employer. Objects of the survey are: characteristics of employer 
(enterprise, local unit) – number of employees in the local unit, type of ownership, existence and type 
of collective pay agreement, size of the enterprise; individual characteristics of employees - age, sex, 
educational level, occupation, length of service, mode of employment (full-time/part-time), working 
hours per day, working days per week, type of employment contract, annual gross earnings, annual 
bonuses, annual days of paid holiday leave, monthly gross earnings, earnings related to overtime, 
earnings related to shift work, employee’s compulsory social security contributions and income tax, 
number of paid monthly hours, and number of paid overtime hours.  
The survey is to be carried out once every four years. The reference year is the calendar 2002. For a 
representative month, October has been approved as being the month that is least affected by absences 
owing to annual leave or public holidays. The statistical units of the survey are both local units with 1 
or more employees belonging to enterprises with 10 or more employees and employees with earnings 
during October 2002, having at least 1 working day paid by the employer at a full rate. For more 
details on this information, see the Eurostat website.  
 
Main definitions  
Employees are all persons who have a direct employment contract with their employer and receive 
remuneration in cash or in kind for certain quality and quantity of work done, irrespective of the type 
of work performed, the number of working hours (full or part-time) and the duration of the 
employment contract (fixed or indefinite). Other categories of workers include:  
￿  apprentices and trainees with an employment contract with the reporting unit.  
￿  seasonal or occasional workers who are working pre-defined hours on a contractual basis 
with the local unit or the enterprise.  
￿  outworkers, but only if there is an explicit agreement that they are remunerated on the 
basis of the amount of hours worked.  
￿  employees on maternity leave as long as they receive remuneration from the employer. 
Conversely, the following categories of workers are excluded: employees, apprentices or trainees 
without an employment contract with the enterprise/local unit; seasonal or occasional workers who are 
employed without pre-defined working hours; persons (i.e. unpaid owners or directors or managers) 
remunerated by way of fees or commission; employees of the observation unit who have been working 
abroad for more than one year in an affiliated company; the self-employed; family workers and 
voluntary workers. 
 
Gross earnings are the remuneration in cash paid to the employee directly and regularly by the 
employer at the time of each pay period, before deductions of any tax and social security contributions 
payable by employee and withheld by the employer.   
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The following are not included: payments paid in this period but relating to other periods, such as 
advances, or pay for holiday or sickness absence outside reference period; periodic bonuses and 
gratuities not paid regularly at each pay date; payments for periods of absence paid by the employer at 
a reduced rate; statutory family allowances; the value of benefits in kind; reimbursements or payments 
for travelling, subsistence etc. or expenses incurred in carrying out the employer's business.  
 
Hourly earnings used here are those received for normal working hours, i.e. for the number of hours 
which the employee is obliged to work in the reference month under the terms of the employment 
contract, regulation or rules in force in the local unit.      
 
Classifications and nomenclatures used  
National Classification of Economic Activities 2001 – fully compliant with the European classification 
NACE Rev. 1.  
National Classification of Occupations – consistent with the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations ISCO-88 (COM).  
Nomenclature of Educational Levels – in compliance with the International Standard Classification of 
Education ISCED’97.  
 
Statistical indicators used 
 
The following weighted averages are used in this paper: Average gross hourly earnings in October 
2002 (overtime excluded). We do not use the median of hourly gross earnings. We do not use either 
monthly or annual data.  
 
Comparability with other surveys  
 
The results from the 2002 Structure of Earnings Survey are not comparable with the average gross 
earnings data and data on number of employees from other surveys carried out by NSI with the same 
indicators:  
1. Quarterly Survey on Number of Employees, Time Worked, Wages and Salaries and Other Labour 
Costs  
2. Annual Survey on Employed Persons, Wages and Salaries and Other Labour Costs  
3. Labour Force Survey  
 
 